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This study applies a threshold model proposed by Granovetter (1978) to analyze the 
dynamic diffusion process of donating behavior for renewable energy. Using data on 
people’s  willingness to donate for renewable energy under various predicted 
participation rates, we simulate how herd behavior spreads and the participation rate 
reaches the equilibrium. The participation rate at the equilibrium is estimated as 66.46% 
when the suggested donation is 500 yen, while it is 25.88% when the suggested amount 
is 1,000 yen. The influence of environmentalism and altruism is also examined, and we 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since 2000 Japanese power companies have established “Green Power Fund” (GPF) 
programs to raise money from customers who volunteer to contribute to the spread of 
renewable energy. Adding their own matching contribution, the companies use  the 
collected money to support those organizations (mostly public facilities and schools) 
that need financial aid to install solar panels or wind-power facilities. As of 2008, 0.02% 
to 0.11% of their customers have participated in such programs by paying an extra sum 
of money (typically 500 Japanese yen) with their monthly electricity bills. 
Since residential electricity markets have not been deregulated in Japan, households 
are not free to choose from among power companies on the basis of the proportion of 
renewable electricity to total electricity that each company generates. Households thus 
have limited chances to make a choice for renewable energy. Although a GPF program 
offers people an opportunity to consider what they want, the participation rate is still 
low. Investigation of a policy to spread support for GPF programs would be a help 
towards understanding how to promote renewable energy. 
As regards people’s motives for making voluntary contributions to renewable energy, 
recent studies focus on the role of moral and psychological aspects. Clark et al. (2003) 
examine whether  environmentalism  and altruism promote participation  in a green 
electricity program that requires individuals to lease at least one 100-W block of solar 
electricity service for an additional fee of $6.59 per block per month. They show that 
both environmentalism  and altruism significantly and independently influence the 
decision  to participate.  Drawing on insights from social psychology, Nyborg et al. 
(2006) explore the potential influence of social interdependency between different 3 
consumers’ moral motivation in explaining the green consumer phenomenon.  They 
claim that consumers may display herd behavior if green consumerism is motivated by 
internalized social norms. An  empirical  analysis of the choice of green electricity 
undertaken by Ek and Söderholm (2008) supports this suggestion. However,  the 
dynamics of the social process that follows from such motivation has not been fully 
addressed in these studies. To understand the social interdependence of consumer 
behavior, it is necessary to model the dynamics of human interaction. 
This paper analyzes such social interaction by examining a threshold model proposed 
by Granovetter (1978). Granovetter (1978) and Granovetter and Soong (1986) use a 
dynamic theory to analyze herd behavior found in riots and in consumer behavior. In 
their theoretical analysis, they assume that an individual has a threshold value that is 
defined as a proportion of the group he/she would have to see join before he/she would 
join. They also assume that the value is different for different people. Their conclusion 
is that the overall influences of the herd behavior depend on the distribution of the 
threshold values of individuals. Also, in his analysis of voting behavior, Tyran (2004) 
investigates theoretically and empirically the role of a person’s expectation of what 
others will do, and he finds that voters tend to vote if they expect many others will vote. 
  Although many studies have examined people’s willingness to participate in green 
electricity programs and the motivations behind that willingness (Bergmann et al. 2006; 
Bergmann et al. 2008; Clark et al. 2003; Ek 2005; Ek and Söderholm 2008; Kotchen 
and Moore 2007; Longo et al. 2008; Menges et al. 2005; Roe et al. 2001; and Zarnikau 
2003), there is no empirical analysis dealing with the dynamic process of diffusion. A 
study of dynamic interdependency is important for considering the diffusion of green 
electricity programs.  In this paper,  we investigate the influence of predicted 4 
participation rate on indivisual support for renewable energy. In addition, we show that 





2.1. The survey 
 
Our analysis is based on data from a double-bounded dichotomous choice contingent 
valuation (CV)  survey of 1,281 randomly  sampled  households in Japan.  The 
respondents were randomly assigned questionnaires (see Appendix) that had different 
CV scenarios and asked about their intention to participate in a GPF program. The CV 
scenarios differed with respect to predicted rates of participation in a GPF program, 
which were assigned exogenously by the researcher. Thus respondents were presented 
with one specific predicted participation rate out of five levels (1%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 
and 90%). The CV scenarios  also varied in accordance with  the first bid (that is, 
contribution per month) suggested. The five levels of initial bid used in the survey are 
shown in Table 1. Accordingly, the total number of scenarios that we created to assign 
each respondent amounted to  25. Each respondent answered only one version,  to 
eliminate the influences of scenario ordering. 
In our double-bounded dichotomous choice format, after the respondent says “yes” or 
“no” in regard to the first bid, he/she is additionally asked his/her reaction to a bid one 
level higher or lower than the first bid. Thus, if a respondent answered “yes” (“no”) to 
the first bid of 100 yen, he/she was then asked the question with the higher (lower) bid 
of 500 (50) yen. 5 
 
 
Table 1. The bid structure in the CV survey (unit: yen/month) 
 
Group of respondents  I  II  III  IV  V 
Initial bid  100  500  1,000  3,000  5,000 
Follow-up question 
for “no” response 
50  100  500  1,000  3,000 
Follow-up question 
for “yes” response 
500  1,000  3,000  5,000  10,000 
Note: $1=¥90.40 (central rate on of Bank of Japan, as of 20 January 2009) 
 
2.2. Random Utility Model 
 
The indirect utility for respondent j can be written as 
ij ij ij v u ε + = ,  (1) 
where  ij v   is  the  deterministic part and  ij ε   is a random error term. Subscript i 
represents the choice made by the respondent, and it becomes 0 when he/she chooses 
the status quo and becomes 1 when he/she donates to a GPF. 
  Assuming the linear utility function, we can express the deterministic term  j v   by a 
vector of the respondents’ characteristics  j z , including the predicted participation rate 
exogenously given in the CV scenario, and can write it as follows (Haab and McConnell 
2002). 
j j j j j j y z y v 0 0 0 ) ( β α + =   (2) 
When the respondent donates to a GPF, the indirect utility can be written as 6 
) ( ) ( 1 1 1 j j j j j j j j t y z t y v − + = − β α .  (3) 
Accordingly, the probability that the respondent will answer “yes” in the single-bounded 
format is written as 
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where  j j j j j j j j j t z z dv 1 0 1 0 1 ) ( ) ( β β β α α − − + − ≡ , and  j j j 0 1 ε ε ε − ≡ .  j 1 ε   and 
j 0 ε are assumed as identically and independently distributed with a mean of zero. 
  The double-bounded CV starts with an initial bid 
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j t t < . Thus there are four possible outcomes: (yes, yes), (yes, no), (no, 
yes), and (no, no). In terms of the random utility maximizing model given above, the 
corresponding response probabilities are 
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where  ) , ( 　 j j β α θ ≡ ,  ) ( 0 1 j j j α α α − ≡ , and  ) ( 0 1 j j j β β β − ≡ . We assume that  ) ; ( θ • G  
is a logistic cumulative distribution function. The double-bounded model can increase 
statistical efficiency over a single-bounded dichotomous choice CV (Hanemann et al. 
1991). 
  The log likelihood function for the responses to a CV survey using the 7 
double-bounded format is 
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where =
YY
j d 1 if respondent j answers (yes, yes) and 0 otherwise,  =
YN
j d 1 if respondent 
j answers (yes, no) and 0 otherwise,  =
NY
j d   1 if respondent j answers (no, yes) and 0 
otherwise,  =
NN
j d   1 if respondent j  answers (no, no) and 0 otherwise.  Using the 











.  (7) 
where  MAX t   is the maximum bid amount (10,000 yen/month in our CV scenario). WTD 
is the maximum amount that the person is willing to pay if he/she can free-ride on other 




The data was collected through an Internet survey conducted by a research company; 
1,281 people aged between 20 and 69 responded to the questionnaire. A summary of the 
data is given in Table 2. To investigate the threshold model, each person is assigned a 
questionnaire that differs with respect to the predicted participation rate (PRATE). Given 
that PRATE, the respondents were to answer yes/no as to whether they are willing to 
donate to a GPF. We assume that a donation is able to reduce the emission of carbon 
dioxide by 3.6 tons per year.   8 
 
Table 2. Definition of variables and summary statistics 
Variable  Definition  Mean  S.D.  Min.  Max. 
PRATE  Predicted participation rate (%) given in scenario  47.26    32.20    1  90 
-  Respondent’s own expected participation rate (%)  20.13    16.70    0  100 
BIAS  PRATE minus respondent’s own expectation  27.14    29.15    -69  90 
CURRENT 
Respondent’s own guesses at current level of 
green power generation in Japan, measured as the 
ratio to total power generation (%) 
5.33    3.70    2.5  17.5 
GENDER  Male=0, female=1  0.43    0.49    0  1 
INCOME  Annual household income in 10 thousands yen  674.28    425.18    150  2500 
AGE  Respondent’s age  47.28    12.77    20  69 
OVER60  =1 if age≥60, 0 otherwise  0.22    0.42    0    1   
HSIZE  Number of people in household  2.98    1.33    1  9 
  Note: S.D.=Standard deviation. 
 
The respondents’ expectations (mean is 20.13%) are generally higher than the actual 
number (between 0.02% and 0.11%). Household income was elicited in categories, with 
income levels coded at the midpoints of the income ranges.  Those samples that had 
some data missing were omitted in the analysis, so that the number of samples used in 
our analysis was 1,110. 
 
2.4. New Ecological Paradigm Scale and Altruism Scale 
 
Along with the psychological influences investigated by the predicted participation 
rate, we considered two internal moral motivations for donating to green energy. We 
included in our analysis scores for two scales: a five-item set for the New Ecological 
Paradigm (NEP) scale and a five-item set for an altruism scale (Kotchen and Moore 
2007). A five-point Likert response scale was used for each item in both scales. The 9 
NEP scale is an instrument that has been developed in the social and behavioral sciences 
for measuring concern about the environment (Dunlap et al., 2000). An altruism scale 
was constructed by Clark et al. (2003), and it relates to awareness of consequences, 
personal norms, and ascriptions of responsibility. Recent economic literature shows that 
both scales have a positive impact on participation in green electricity programs and a 
willingness to pay for green electricity (Clark et al. 2003; Kotchen and Moore 2007; Ek 
and Söderholm, 2008). Although the Cronbach’s alpha of each scale shows that both 
scales did not pass the test of internal consistency, we combine  the items into a 
summated scale for ease of analysis. These statistics are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Item-total correlations and Cronbach's alpha for NEP and altruism scales 
 
  Correlation 
NEP scale   
1. Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist.  0.526   
2. The so-called ecological crisis facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated.  0.648   
3. Human ingenuity will insure that we do not make the earth unlivable.  0.204   
4. The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources.  0.530   
5. The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial 
nations. 
0.669   
Cronbach's alpha  0.308   
   
Altruism scale   
1. Contributions to community organizations rarely improve the lives of others.  0.608   
2. The individual alone is responsible for his or her well-being in life.  0.437   
3. It is my duty to help other people when they are unable to help themselves.  0.627   
4. My responsibility is to provide only for my family and myself.  0.564   
5. My personal actions can greatly improve the well-being of people I don't know.  0.534   
Cronbach's alpha  0.437   
Notes: Responses are based on a five-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly agree”  to  “strongly 
disagree”. Responses are coded from 1 to 5, such that higher numbers correspond to greater concern 




3.1. Model estimation 
 
The estimation result for the double-bounded logit model is shown in Table 4. Model 
1 considers income, household size, gender,  and age as sociodemographic 
characteristics of respondents. After the testing of several combinations of cross terms 
between income and individual attributes, Model 2 has a smaller AIC and BIC. The 
coefficient for income is significant and has the expected sign in this model. 
The negative coefficients of PRICE mean that the marginal utility of the expense is 
negative as expected. While the coefficients of PRATE are significantly positive, the 
squared terms of PRATE are not significant. This result suggests that decisions to donate 
depend on others’  behavior and that the marginal utility increases constantly with 
others’ participation rate. 
The  coefficients  for  the  BIAS  variable are  negative  and significant.  When the 
difference between the assigned participation rate in the scenario and the respondent’s 
own prediction is large, the credibility of the CV scenario decreases. Thus, the BIAS 
variable can be interpreted as representing the bias created by an incredible hypothetical 
participation  rate. Wiser (2007) shows  that  a  respondent’s expectation of  others’ 
participation has a significantly positive impact on the willingness to pay for renewable 
energy. Our analysis assigns a predicted participation rate and controls the impact of 
self-prediction by this variable. The result indicates that when the respondent’s 
expectation exceeds the assigned prediction, the probability of agreeing to the suggested 
donation to a GPF decreases. 
The coefficient of CURRENT is positive, but not significant. This variable represents 11 
guesses  by respondents regarding  the percentage of green electricity to  total power 
generation in Japan. We find that the amount of current green electricity predicted by a 
respondent does not influence donation behavior significantly. 
 
Table 4. Estimation results for double-bounded logit models 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error 
CONSTANT  -4.32070***    0.74243    -4.82093***    0.76112   
PRICE  -0.00122***    0.00004    -0.00122***    0.00004   
PRATE  0.03174***    0.00965    0.03117***    0.00960   
PRATE
2  -0.00004    0.00009    -0.00004  0.00009   
BIAS  -0.03370***    0.00479    -0.03348***    0.00477   
CURRENT  0.00593    0.02017    0.00883    0.01973   
INCOME  0.00026    0.00019    0.00115***    0.00043   
HSIZE  -0.04326    0.06020    0.14630    0.10235   
GENDER  0.23443    0.15371    0.23396    0.15394   
AGE  0.00522    0.00592       
OVER60      0.31108*    0.17597   
HSIZE·INCOME      -0.00026**    0.00012   
NEP  0.09315***    0.02959    0.09673***    0.02959   
ALTRUISM  0.10768***    0.03001    0.10850***    0.03024   
Log-likelihood  -1148.19      -1143.73     
AIC  2320.38      2313.46     
BIC  2380.53      2378.62     
N  1110      1110     
Note:  *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10%. AIC =-2(LL-K), BIC=-2LL+Klog(N), where LL is the 
log-likelihood, K is the number of parameters, and N is the number of observations. 
 
While the coefficients of AGE and GENDER in Model 1 and GENDER in Model 2 
are not significant, the coefficients of OVER60 and HSIZE·INCOME are significant. 
The negative significance found for the coefficient of HSIZE·INCOME shows that the 12 
higher income of individuals with a higher household size diminishes the probability of 
them agreeing to the suggested amount. The positive and significant results of NEP and 
ALTRUISM show that respondents who have higher values for these indices tend to 
agree to donate. 
The mean of WTD is 567.98 yen per month when calculated using the mean value as 
the exogenous variable in Model 2. In the next section, we combine the economic 
model estimated as Model 2 and a threshold model in social psychology in order to 
analyze the possibility of a dynamic diffusion of a GPF. 
 
3.2. Simulations by threshold models 
 
We begin by simulating  dynamic changes in the  participation rate using the 
coefficients of the estimated models. In accordance with the discussion by Granovetter 
(1978), the concept of threshold models can be explained by Figure 1. Let us denote 
threshold values by x and the cumulative distribution function (cdf) by F(x). The cdf 
indicates the proportion of the population having a threshold less than or equal to x. The 
proportion of the population who have participated in a donation by time t is denoted as 
r(t). Then the proportion of those who are  going to donate at t+1 is described by 
r(t+1)=F[r(t)]. 
Since r(t+1) = F[r(t)], we can find the proportion of those donating in period t+1 by 
following the arrow from r(t) to the point above it on the cdf. This point is reflected 
again on the x-axis, by following the horizontal arrow to the 45º line, F(x)=x. This 
procedure is repeated to find r(t+2) = F[r(t+1)], and continues until reaching the point E1 
where the cdf crosses the 45º line. This point is an equilibrium denoted by the equation 13 
F(r)=r. Figure 1 has two possible equilibria. If the share of participants in the beginning 
is below E2, equilibrium is reached at E1. If the share at the initial period is given above 
E2, the final equilibrium becomes E3. 
 











Since the cumulative share of participants equals the probability of “yes” responses to 
a suggested amount of donation in a CV survey (Pr(yes)), we can construct the cdf by 
calculating Pr(yes) with various predicted participation rates. Simulated threshold 
models for different suggested amounts of donation are shown in Figure 2. The cdf 
intersects with the 45º line once in all models, so that we have a unique equilibrium 
point regardless of the initial condition. The cumulative share of participants at dynamic 
equilibrium decreases for higher suggested amounts of donation. The share of 
participants at equilibrium is 83.22% when  the suggested amount is 100 yen, then 
decreases to 66.46%, 25.88% and 1.42% when the amount increases to 500, 1,000, and 
3,000 yen. This result indicates that the amount of donation asked can harm the process 
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of dynamic diffusion. Among the four suggested amounts, the highest expected value of 
donation at equilibrium is 332.3 in the case of 500 yen. 
 























Note:  Simulations are based on Model  2 in Table 4. We calculate  the  cumulative distribution 
functions by assuming mean values for all variables (except the BIAS variable, which takes zero). 
For the case of “Non-environmentalism”, “Non-altruistic”, “Neither”, we give zero values to NEP, 
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The equilibrium is also influenced by the existence of environmental concern and 
altruistic motivation. We show in Figure 2 the cdfs will shift downward when the score 
for the NEP scale, the altruism scale, or both of them become zero. On average, the 
existence of these motivations increases the equilibrium participation rate by 43.38%. 
This result suggests that a policy to enhance them has important implications for the 
diffusion of donating behavior. 
 
4. Conclusions and remarks 
 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, a decision to donate to a 
GPF program depends on the overall participation rate. Second, a higher  predicted 
participation rate attracts those who have not participated in green electricity programs. 
Third, environmentalism and an  altruistic motivation can play a role in driving the 
equilibrium participation rate higher. Fourth, the impact of the predicted participation 
rate at equilibrium depends on the bid amount. 
Our analysis by threshold models shows that the  expected participation rate 
influences individual decisions to donate and the resulting dynamic equilibrium of a 
GPF program. The dynamic equilibrium also depends on the impact on  people’s 
motivation of their environmental concern and altruistic views. On the other hand, our 
analysis does not directly address why people follow other people’s behavior. Ek and 
Söderholm (2008) suggest that the choice of a green electricity company is determined 
both by economic factors and by the presence of social norms. Investigation of the 
motivation for herd behavior is a topic needing further study. 
Our results show that the higher the suggested amount of donation, the lower the 16 
participation rate in equilibrium. Fund raisers should take into account this effect when 
setting the suggested amount to be donated, if they wish to maximize the total amounts 
donated, rather than the participation rate. Further developments from empirical studies 
based  on threshold models would be important for examining the successfulness of 
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Appendix: 
“Questionnaire about Environmentally-Friendly Energy” 
 
The following situation is hypothetical. It has absolutely nothing to 
do with the operations of the electric company with which you are 
registered. It is hypothetical, but for the purposes of this survey 
please respond after carefully imagining if “these events were to 
actually occur.” 
Please imagine that the electric company you are registered with is 
attempting to further promote the spread of clean power generation 
methods such as wind power and solar power.  
 
Since these new power generation methods have higher costs in comparison 
to thermal power generation and nuclear power generation, there has been 
little progress in making them widespread.  
 
Therefore, the electric company has established the “Natural Energy 
Fund” and will request a donation of XX yen each month from each customer. 
The monthly donation will be collected by adding the amount to be donated 
to each customer’s monthly electricity bill.  
  
The electric company will meet the total donated amount with its own 
donation of that same amount, and use it toward the construction costs 
of clean power generation facilities for municipal offices and 
elementary schools, etc.  
 
  
Thanks to your donation, annual CO2 emissions will be reduced by 3.6 
tons (almost equal to the annual CO2  emissions from a single household’s 
electricity consumption). Furthermore, detailed information regarding 
the recipients of the funds will be disclosed on the internet. 
  
According to preliminary surveys,      percentage of your electricity 




Q1. Do you think you would want to give a donation of    X   yen each 
month over the one year period between April 2009 and March 2010 (single 
answer)? 
 
What if the donation was for    Y   yen each month?  
 